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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DRAFT BOARD ORDERS
HISTORICAL SKETCH

Early in the development of this country, conscription was recognized
as essential to the protection and preservation of the national welfare in
times of threat. Some of our early presidents-Washington, Madison, and
jefferson,-acknowledged the necessity of military service by compulsion;
however, the advocates of federal conscription were met with overwhelming
congressional opposition.1 The authority of Congress to pass laws providing
for the conscription of men has as its basis the clause empowering Congress
to ". . . raise and support armies .
2.."2
This power is amply supplemented
3
by the necessary and proper clause.
To cope with the exigencies of the then existing situation, Congress
exercised this power by passing the first federal draft act on March 3,
1863, 4 entitled, "An Act for the enrolling and calling out the national
forces, and for other purposes." Subsequent to the passage of this Act,
statutes of similar import were passed in 1917,5 1940,1 and 1948.7 The
constitutionality of each of these Selective Service Acts has been challenged
and the courts have repeatedly upheld their validity, s to such a vigorous
extent that any prospective litigant may wisely assume that the contention
of unconstitutionality has been conclusively withdrawn from the area of
debate.
The perplexing question now before the courts in relation to the
Selective Service Act of 19 48,9 (hereinafter called "the Act") is tinder what
circumstances and to what extent draft orders may be judicially reviewed.
By an express provision of the Act, classification orders by selective service
authorities "shall be final." 10 To what degree the letter of the law as to
the finality of the order is to be followed presented in the first instance, at
best, a perplexing problem. 1' As we shall now see, current case law gives
tIS some indication of the extent to which draft orders will be judicially
reviewed.
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Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 6. p. 284.
U.S. Const., Art. I, sec. 10, cl.12.
Ibid, Art. I, sec. 10, cl.18.
12 Stat. 731 (1863).
Selective Draft Act of 1917, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76 (1917).
Selective Service Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 894 (1940).
Selective Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 604 (1948), as amended 50 U.S.C. Supp, sec.
450, 50 U.S.C.A. Supp., sec. 450.
(a) The 1863 Draft Act was upheld in Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa.St. 238 (1863);
McCall's Case, 15 Fed.Cas. 1225, No. 8, 669 (Ed.Pa. 1863). (b) The validity of the
Selective Draft Act of 1917 was asserted in "Selective Draft Law Cases," 245 U.S.
366, 38 S.Ct. 159, 62 L.Ed. 349 (1918).
(c) The constitutionality of the Selective
Service Act of 1948 was affirmed in United States v. Bolton, 192 F.2d 805 (2nd Cir.
1951).
62 Stat. 604 (1948), as amended 50 U.S.C. Supp. sec. 450, 50 U.S.C.A. Supp., sec. 450.
Ibid.
In Frank v. Murray, 248 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1918), it was indicated by way of
obiter dicta that improper classification would only be available as a defense if
the board lacked jurisdiction. Here the court failed to set out the jurisdictional
facts necessary in order to make the board's action legal.

NOTES

FALBO V. UNITED STATES

In the leading case of Falbo v. United States,' Nick Falbo was convicted under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, for the crime
of willfully failing to obey a local draft board order' 3 to report for assignment to work of national importance. Falbo defended on the grounds that
he was entitled to a statutory exemption from all forms of national service
because he was an ordained minister.14 He further asserted that it was the
duty of the court to review the classification order to ascertain whether
the local board had been prejudicial, unfair, and arbitrary. From these
facts, the Court narrowed the issue to:
Whether congress has authorized judicial review of the propriety
of a board's classification in a criminal prosecution for wilful
violation of an order directing a registrant to report for the last
step in the selective process ...."This query was answered in the negative. In affirming the conviction,
the Court, through Mr. Justice Black, held that a registrant could not
defend on the grounds that lie was wrongfully classified and was entitled
to a statutory exemption, where the offense was a failure to report for
induction into the armed forces or for work of national importance. An
application for judicial review is premature, said the Court, if made prior
to the time when the registrant has taken all steps in the selective process,
and has finally been accepted by the armed forces. The Court asserted that

even if judicial review is a constitutional right, the registrant could not
avail himself of it until final acceptance by the national service.
Because the Supreme Court refused to grant judicial review in the
Falbo case, the lower federal courts interpreted the decision as meaning
that no judicial review at all of a selective service order may be afforded a
registrant.' 6 judicial review really was denied for failure of the registrant
to exhaust his administrative remedies or to complete the administrative
process. The Falbo decision not only failed to aid registrants desirous of
securing judicial review of draft orders, but presented another problem
which necessitated solution before the issue of judicial review itself could
be raised, to wit: When is the administrative process complete?
THE TREND AWAY

FROM THE FALBO DOCTRINE

Through a series of decisions on points particularly related to the
17
completion of the administrative process, such as, Billings v. Truesdell,
12.
13.
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Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 64 S.Ct. 346, 88 L.Ed. 305 (1944).
54 Stat. 885, 50 U.S.C. Supp. sec. 301-318, 50 U.S.C.A. Supp. sec. 301-318. Sec. 11
makes one criminally liable for wilful failure or neglect to perform any duty required by the Act.
Sec. 5 (d) of the Act exempts ordained ministers from training and service.
Falbo v. United States, supra at 349.
See Cox v. United States. 332 U.S. 442, 68 S.Ct. 115, 92 L.Ed. 59 (1947).
This case
Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542, 64 S.Ct. 737, 88 LEd. 917 (1944).
held that a selectee becomes actually inducted and subject to military law only
when he finally undergoes whatever ceremony or requirements of admission the
Defense Department has prescribed. Military law was not applicable in the Billings
case because the defendant had refused to take the oath; therefore the civil courts
had jurisdiction over all violations.

WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

Estep v. United States,'8 Gibson v: United States,19 and certain regulation
changes, 2 0 the Supreme Court finally came around to holding in the last
mentioned case that: (1) conscientious objectors21 are not required to
report to camp in order to complete the administrative process; and, (2)
they are not foreclosed by the Falbo decision 22 from making on criminal
trial any defense open to them, once the registrants have finally been
accepted for military service. The Court asserted that the latter rule
applied if one had proceeded beyond the point of an exhaustion of administrative remedies. It is thus apparent from these decisions that the
administrative process is complete when administrative appeals are exhausted 23 and a final order has been received from the draft board.
THE SCOPE OF REVIEw-THE ESTEP CASE

After this hurdle was crossed, the Supreme Court squarely faced the
question of the scope of judicial review of draft orders in Estep v. United
States.24 Estep was convicted in a criminal case on a charge of refusing
to submit to induction into the armed forces under section 11 of the Act.
Lower federal courts relied on Falbo v. United States2 5 and refused to
allow the defense that the local board in issuing the draft order exceeded
its jurisdiction, inasmuch as Estep was entitled to a IV-D classification.
However, the Supreme Court rejected the argument of the prosecution
that no litigious interruption in the selective process can be tolerated, and
that a judicial inquiry into the validity of an induction order during the
course of a criminal proceeding for refusing to submit to induction, is a
prime example of litigious interruption. The Court held that the defendant was entitled to a judicial review of his contention that the local
board had exceeded its jurisdiction, and that it was not necessary for the
defendant to submit to induction and resort to habeas corpus before he
could contest the draft board's order. The Court, through Mr. Justice
Douglas, stated: "Submission to induction would be satisfaction of the
orders of the local boards, not a further step to obtain relief from them."
The Falbo case 25 was found inapplicable because here Estep had exhausted
his administrative remedies. 2 7 In this decision, the majority was careful
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Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 66 S.Ct. 423, 90 L.Ed. 567 (1946).
Gibson v. United States, 329 U.S. 338, 67 S.Ct. 301, 91 L.Ed. 331 (1946).
See sec. 653.11 et seq. of the Selective Service Regulations.
Under sec. 5(g) of the Act, persons having IV-E classifications are given conscientious objector status and are assigned to non-combatant service, or to work of
national importance under civilian direction.
Falbo v. United States, supra note 12.
Method of appeal under present Act: After the appeal board decides against the
selectee and his file in returned to the local board, selectee has the right under
selective service regulations to examine all of his file, including the recommendations
of the Department, 32 C.F.R. sec. 1606 32 (a) (1) ; 32 C.F.R. sec. 1606.38 (c). (Justice
Department investigates, holds a hearing and makes a written report to the appeal
board before said board reaches a decision). If reopening is denied, he may present
his contentions to the Director of Selective Service, requesting a reopening of his
classification or a reconsideration by the appeal board. 32 C.F.R. sec. 1625.3 (a)
32 C.F.R. see. 1626.61 (a).
Estep v. United States, supra note 18.
Falbo v. United States, supra note 12.
Ibid.
For remedies provided within the selective service agency, supra note 23.

NOTES

to point out: (a) that courts were not to weigh the evidence to determine
whether the classification made by the local board was justified, (b) board
decisions are final, even though erroneous, if made in conformity with the
regulations and (c) the jurisdictional point is to be decided only if there
is no "basis in fact" for the classification which the registrant received.
The remedy of habeas corpus was considered, but excluded as not being
expedient or favorable to cases of this character. A majority failed to
perceive why "the court would send a man to jail today when it was
apparent he would have to be released tomorrow."
2In applying the "basis in fact" test developed in the Estep case,
one who examines the record on appeal to determine conformity is likely
to be susceptible to the weight of the evidence and influenced thereby in
his ultimate decision. This possibility has not seemed to worry the courts
because the "basis in fact test," with its outgrowths, has been utilized
wherever applicable. Examples of such utilization are Sunal v. Large,2
Smith v. United States,30 United States ex rel. Trainin v. Cain,31 Benzian
v. Godwina 2and Cox v. United States.-', In affirming a conviction under
the Act in the last mentioned case, the Court vigorously asserted that any
charge to a jury without considering the action of the board would have
been improper because whether there was no "basis in fact" for the board's
classification is not a question to be determined by the jury on an independent determination of the evidence. Once the judge decides that the
file supports the board, nothing in selective service file is pertinent to any
issue proper for jury consideration. In other words, once the judge determines that the evidence in the selective service file supports the decision
which the board has reached, such evidence is not to be reweighed on
appeal.
THE NECESSITY OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

TO SUPPORT ORDERS

As we have seen from the Estep3 4 and Cox35 cases, judicial review of the
jurisdiction of the local board is purportedly reached only if there is no
"basis in fact" for the classification which it gave the registrant, and the
courts may interfere only where the local board lacks jurisdiction to make
the order. However, Annett v. United States3 6 is an example of the
influence of substantial evidence on the jurisdictional issue. Here Annett
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

33.
34.
35.
36.

Estep v. United States, supra note 18.
Sunal v. Large, 157 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1946).
Held: draft orders are final as to
judicial review unless there is no basis in statutes for the classification which the
local board gave the registrant.
Smith v. United States, 157 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1946).
United States ex rel. Trainin v. Cain, 144 F.2d 944 (2nd Cir. 1944). Cert. denied,
323 U.S. 795, rehearing denied, 323 U.S. 819 (1945), cited with approval in the
Estep case.
Benzian v. Godwin, 168 F.2d 952 (2nd Cir. 1948).
This case held that where
determination of registrant's status under the Act by the Director does not appear
to be without a basis in fact, the Court of Appeals is not empowered to review
the Director's determination.
Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442, 68 S.Ct. 423, 90 L.Ed. 567 (1946).
Estep v. United States, supra note 18.
Cox v. United States, supra note 16.
Annett v. United States, 205 F.2d 689 (10th Cir. 1953).
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was convicted for failing to submit to induction under the Act. He defended on the grounds that the board's order classifying him as 1-A was
erroneous and without factual basis. He presented voluminous evidence
before the board tending to show that he was a bona fide member of
Jehovah's Witnesses, but the board chose not to believe it and relied on the
testimony of other witnesses, which lacked the support of any facts. The
Court, on examining the record and finding no substantial evidence to
support the board's order, concluded the board lacked jurisdiction and
37
In
held the order void. A similar case is Dickinson v. United States.
reversing a conviction under section 12 (a) of the Act, the Court, through
Mr. Justice Clark, stated:
. . . The task of the court in cases such as this is to search tile

record for some affirmative evidence to support the local board's
overt or implicit finding that a registrant has not painted a complete or accurate picture of his activities. We have found none
here. . . . When the uncontroverted evidence supporting a registrant's claim places him prinia facie within statutory. exemption,
dismissal of the claim solely on the basis of suspicion and speculation is both contrary to the spirit of the Act and foreign to our
concepts of justice.
s
The effect upon local boards of decisions like Annett,1 Dickinson

9

40

and the hint which was given in Niznik v. United States, is a healthy
one. Such decisions exert pressure upon local boards, not only to make
decisions in conformity with the regulations of the Act, but also to weigh
the evidence carefully in order to make certain that their orders are supported by substantial evidence. This position counteracts, to a certain
degree, the effect of the holding in the Estep case 41 that erroneous decisions
of the board are to be final if made in conformity with the Act. One gets
the impression that the board's decision cannot conform with the Act if
it is not supported by substantial evidence; however, the appropriate provisions of the Act itself,42 indicate an opposite conclusion.
Cases like United States v. Witner4" by contrast present quite a different situation. Here the court affirmed a conviction for refusing to
submit to induction, stating that where the evidence supports two inferences, review within the selective service system is final. There is an echo
of Estep in the court's assertion that, on judicial review, it will abstain
from acting as a super draft board if the draft order has any "basis in fact."
37.

Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389, 74 S.Ct. 152, 98 L.Ed. 132 (1953).

38.
39.
40.

Annett v. United States, supra note 36.
Dickinson v. United States, supra note 37.
Niznik v. United States, 184 F.2d 972 (6th Cir. 1950). The court reversed a conviction on the ground that the local board's order was not based on sufficient
evidence, and thus was contrary to the regulation.
Estep v. United States, supra note 18.
Selective Service and Training Act of 1946, sec. 10(a) (2), 50 U.S.C.A. Supp. sec.
310(a) (2). Courts must not weigh evidence to determine whether classification
made by the local boards are justified.
United States v. Witner, 348 U.S. 375, 75 S.Ct. 392, 99 LEd. 327 (1955).

41.
42.
43.

NOTES
DENIAL OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS IS SUBJECT TO REVIEW

Judicial review of draft orders has not been limited to questions of
evidence. Tung v. United States4 4 reversed a local board order which
directed a registrant to report for induction without allowing him the
appeal to which he was entitled under the Act. Denials of procedural
rights have likewise brought reversals in the courts.
United States v. Nugent 45 was one of many such cases. The defense
here was that the litigant was denied a fair resume of the evidence in the
investigator's report.46 The Supreme Court held that judicial review was
proper, but that the defendant need not be permitted to see the investigator's report, or be given names of persons interviewed; that in a hearing
the Justice Department sufficiently performs its duty if it accords fair
opportunity to the registrant to speak freely before an impartial hearing
officer, allows him to produce all relevant evidence in his behalf and
supplies him in advance with a fair resume of any evidence in the investigator's report.
47
Two years later the Supreme Court distinguished the Nugent case ill
Simmons v. United States4 s because the summary of the FBI reports was
available to the registrant in the former case, whereas in Simmons not even
a summary was supplied to the registrant. The majority opinion stated
that failure of the registrant to request a resume of the Justice Department's
report prior to the hearing does not constitute a waiver, and that a partial
disclosure by the hearing officer is not a fair resume of the report. Fair
resume was defined as:
. . . one which will permit the registrant to defend against the

adverse evidence-to explain it, rebut it, or otherwise detract
from its damaging force....
Even though the statute49 was silent on this procedural right, the Court
considered the defendant's right to this report as a fundamental safeguard
essential to basic fairness.
The same consequence occurs when the registrant has not been furnished with the Justice Department's recommendation or informed of its
contents prior to an adverse decision by the board, even though such procedure is not expressly provided for in the regulations, 50 or the report is
not requested by the registrant, 5 1 and he is entirely without knowledge
52
of such right.
44.
45.
46.

Tung v. United States, 142 F.2d 919 (1st Cir. 1944).
United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1, 73 S.Ct. 991, 97 L.Ed. 1417 (1953).
For the appropriate regulations, see C.F.R. 1626.25 (1949 ed.); 17 Fed. Reg. 5449,
June 18, 1952. See also sec. 6(j) of the Act, as amended 50 U.S.C.A. Supp., sec.

50.

456(j).
United States v. Nugent, supra note 45.
Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S. 397, 75 S.Ct. 397, 99 L.Ed. 339 (1955).
Universal Military Training and Service Act, sec. 6 (j) as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. Supp.,
sec. 456(j).
Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407, 75 S.Ct. 409, 99 L.Ed. 345 (1955).

51.

United States v. Good, 131 F.Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa. 1955).

52.

United States v. Bunder, 131 F.Supp. 414 (M.D. Pa. 1955).

47.
48.
49.
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CONCLUSION

The "quick freeze" of the pronouncement in Falbo v. United States
that judicial review under the Act was altogether unavailable, because
Congress had entrusted the administration of the selective service system to
the civilian agency and not to the courts, has been melted by later decisions.
53
It is now established that the silence of Congress as to judicial review
does not preclude federal courts from extending relief in the exercise of
their general jurisdiction, which has been expressly granted by Congress.
The registrant can now predict fairly accurately when he will or will not
be afforded judicial review of draft orders.
It has been established through the cases herein discussed that a
judicial review of draft orders will be afforded: (a) when a registrant is
compelled to comply with an order before being given the right to exhaust
his administrative remedies by appeal within the agency, (b) if there is
no "basis in fact" for the order issued by the board, (c) or the order by the
board is not supported by substantial evidence, (d) or if the registrant is
denied a procedural right to which he is entitled, (e) or if the order is
arbitrary and capricious.
The total effect of the judicial product to date is to curb the inclinations of some local boards to be careless or dogmatic in the issuance of
draft orders, a consummation devoutly to be wished in an area which so
profoundly affects the lives of many people.
THEODORE JEFFERSON

THE PROBLEM OF THE CHILD "WITNESS
As nearly any mother will concede, one of the primary features of
small children is the ambulatory characteristic; they get around. Thus,
they often are in the right place at the right time to see people, things
and events that are never witnessed by an adult. Because of this propensity
their testimony may on occasion be of extreme importance in the litigation
of a civil action or in a criminal prosecution. It should be pointed out that
this same characteristic frequently places children in out-of-the-way places
where atrocious crimes are committed against their persons. Since such
acts are always committed in privacy the testimony of the child is frequently the most important evidence available in prosecuting the perpetrator of such a crime. These factors indicate that the probability is
quite good that at some time during his professional career an attorney
will want to call upon the testimony of a child. When he does he is confronted by two problems:
(1) He must qualify the child as a competent witness.
(2) He must elicit testimony from the child in an understandable and
convincing manner.
53.

62 Stat. 604 (1948),

for amendments-supra note 8.

